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In the first moments of the now infamous German Autumn of 1977, when members of the Red Army Faction (RAF) kidnapped the West German Employer's Association President Hanns-Martin Schleyer and demanded the release of their incarcerated comrades from Stammheim Maximum Security Prison, the liberal daily newspaper Die Zeit published commentary from the New Left icon of the 1960s, Rudi Dutschke. Still active in a number of extra-parliamentary causes, Dutschke differentiated the revolutionary activism of the West German New Left and its two most oft-cited "groups" -the Sozialistische Deutsche Studentenbund (The German Socialist Student League, SDS) and the Außerparlamentarische Opposition (Extra-Parliamentary Opposition, APO)-from that of the RAF and other urban guerrilla or "terrorist" outfits in the 1970s. 2 Specifically, Dutschke emphasized the democratic ideals of the previous decade's New Left, noting how "In 1967, we spoke out unequivocally against the murder of Benno Ohnesorg. Indeed, for democratically-inclined socialists and communists … the situation has not changed in the 1970s" (Dutschke, 1977: 10) . By contrast, the activist described the RAF's "violence not as a wrongheaded strategy, but as an illegitimate form of oppositional politics," stating, "Individual terror is terror which will culminate in individual despotism, but it will not lead to socialism. Despotism was not the goal of the German New Left, and it never will be" (Dutschke, 1977: 9, 10) . "We" vs. "individual." "Democratically-inclined" vs. "Despotic." For Dutschke, the radical activism of the New Left and of the RAF were dissimilar.
Media, Memory, and Activism: Rudi Dutschke and the Politics of Commemorating West Germany's New Left
Recalling then Wulf Kansteiner's claim that "collective memories have a strong bias toward the present" (Kansteiner, 2006: 14) , this paper explores the ways in which Rudi Dutschke crafted and regulated collective memories of the West German New Left from roughly 1975 to 1977, a conjuncture of commemoration, terror-related conflict, and extra-parliamentary activism. Throughout this moment, the West German mass media 3 proved especially important for Dutschke's "long march through the institutions," a strategy described by Herbert Marcuse of "working against the established institutions while working within them" that both purposely as well as unintentionally fostered conflict within the newsroom and the West German radical left alike (Marcuse, 1972: 55) . 4 First, to better understand the relationship between Dutschke's memory advocacy and the West German media institutions of the time, the essay surveys the politics of mass media commemoration which surrounded the ten-year anniversary of Benno Ohnesorg's death in June of 1977. Shot and killed by an undercover police officer at a New Left rally against the visiting Shah of Iran on 2 June 1967, Ohnesorg emerged as both a symbol and a rallying cry for reform-minded activists who were convinced that West German society had failed to fully overcome its fascist past. 5 For the antiauthoritarian wing of the New Left however, the tragedy intensified calls for direct action, resistance, and in some instances violence. Indeed, following the attempted assassination of Dutschke prior to the Easter weekend of 1968, 6 a second important moment in West Germany's "1968," militants retreated to the West Berlin underground and established urban guerrilla movements such as the RAF, the 2 June Movement, and the Tupamaros West-Berlin. 7 Irrespective of one's politics or views of the New Left then, media outlets during the ten-year anniversary of Ohnesorg's death in 1977 analyzed the student movement past through the lens of the urban guerrilla present, as columnists linked the activism of the late 1960s with forms of violence deemed "irrational," terroristic, and politically incoherent.
While such commemorations contributed to the dominance of negative memories in moments of crisis, these constructions were reliant upon the "expert" testimonies of the former New Leftists themselves, and thus locations remained within the media for negotiation and contestation. This was especially true for a student of "reification," hegemony, and the writings of Gramsci like Dutschke. 8 To this degree, Dutschke's actions exemplify the memory scholar Barbie Zelizer's contention that, "Collective memories allow for the fabrication, rearrangement, elaboration, and omission of details about the past, often pushing aside accuracy and authenticity so as to accommodate broader issues of identity formation, power and authority, and political affiliation. Memories in this view become not only the simple act of recall, but social, cultural, and political action at its broadest level" (Zelizer, 1998: 3) . Zelizer's description of memory and its processes of production raise important questions regarding power, contestation, and dissent. Indeed, I address these concerns throughout the remainder of the essay; Dutschke challenged the normative memory narratives of the student movement past in the mass media, promoting positive and to some extent "sanitized" narratives that were linked to contemporary expressions of social activism rather than the violent actions of urban guerrilla outfits. In so doing, Dutschke cultivated a symbiotic relationship that positively defined the past and benefited contemporary forms of protest. Just as the media scholar Kathrin Fahlenbrach conceives of the West German student movement of the 1960s as a "revolt against the media and revolt by means of media," so too is the description apt when analyzing Dutschke and his memory engagements in the second half of the 1970s (Fahlenbrach, 2002: 179) . Even in moments of media or memory consensus such as the ten-year commemoration of Benno Ohnesorg's death or the German Autumn of 1977, institutional spaces existed where activists could challenge mass media discourses and structures of power. In this respect, I use the issue of memory to reveal the mass media as a site for hegemonic struggle.
Still, Dutschke's advocacy for the burgeoning social movements of the 1970s was complex, especially when it involved his interactions with the West German mass media and the deployment of memories concerning the 1960s New Left. By analyzing the radical's unpublished correspondences and -through these sources-exploring his relationships with both media personalities and social activists in the mid-to late-1970s, I paint a much more complicated picture of Dutschke and his methods of memory and media activism than is typically found in the historiography. Certainly, scholars correctly portray Dutschke as an important figure in the rise of the Green Movement -among other causes-throughout 1970s West Germany. Nonetheless, Dustchke's cooperation came with expectations, if not outright stipulations. He carefully navigated contemporary activists' requests for support both inside and outside of the press. He pursued defamation lawsuits against publishers who in his mind misrepresented his past activities. And he confronted journalists who ignored specific details and facts in their commemorations of the West German New Left. In sum, Dutschke was an extra-parliamentary "gatekeeper;" he was protective and strategic with the use of his legacy and the memory of 1968, especially as it concerned the shaping of public opinion for the advancement of contemporary social movements. By closely examining Rudi Dutschke's interactions with the media and his fellow activists through the "lens" of memory, the essay raises important insights into the reconfiguration of the West German left following "1968" and the role of the mainstream press within this process.
Memories of the New Left, Revolutionary Violence, and the 10-year anniversary of Benno Ohnesorg's Death
As previously noted, the ten-year anniversary of Benno Ohnesorg's death provided members of the media an opportunity to assess not only the recent New Left past but also the urban guerrilla present. By 1977, such memory rituals were not unusual given the continued and well-publicized strikes of urban guerrilla outfits, many of which were composed of recognizable members of the New Left, including Ulrike Meinhof, Horst Mahler, Andreas Baader, and Gudrun Ensslin of the RAF as well as Fritz Teufel and Dieter Kunzelmann of the Tupamaros West-Berlin. Nor were such connections without some degree of historical merit. First, members of the New Left and urban guerrilla movements shared common revolutionary traditions, embracing "avant-gardism" 9 and drawing from the then fashionable theories of "Third World" revolutionaries such as Che Guevara, Frantz Fanon, Ho Chi Minh, and Mao Zedong (Kalter, 2012) . In this respect, leaders of the New Left and the RAF in particular viewed their actions as antiImperial expressions of "Third World" solidarity within the metropole. Second, "Third Worldism" blended with memories of Germany's fascist past to justify growing aggressiveness against the West German state. Citing acts of police brutality against student protesters as evidence that the West German nation had failed to denazify, Meinhof in her columns for the socialist journal Konkret advanced the need for "counter-violence," an idea also explored by Dutschke and other member of the West Berlin "Editorial Collective" in the summer of 1968. 10 Last, symbolism and spectacle remained important ingredients for the radical left in the 1960s and 1970s. For example, by evoking the memory of the fallen Ohnesorg, the 2 June Movement attempted to justify its revolutionary violence against a supposedly repressive state. Additionally, urban guerrilla strikes against former New Left "antagonists" -such as the RAF bombing of Springer Verlag's Hamburg publishing house during the May Offensive of 1972-reinforced discursive links between contemporary urban guerrilla strikes and the student movement past.
While a number of high-profile historians contend these connections reveal the West German New Left's violent proclivities, Ingrid Gilcher-Holtey warns against such reductionism, claiming that the ways in which notions of "direct action," "resistance," and "violence" were applied to shifting West German conditions varied according to the "cognitive orientations of individuals and groups" (Gilcher-Holtey, 2010: 156) . Timothy Scott Brown puts a finer point on this historiographical debate, concluding that "the either-or question of whether the 'terrorists' were also '68ers' (or vice versa) holds less significance for our understanding of the antiauthoritarian revolt in West Germany than it does as an entry in the ongoing war over the politics of memory in Germany" (Brown, 2013: 338) . 11 Time does not permit a full investigation into the intersection of professional history and popular memory; rather, what I wish to draw from Brown and Gilcher-Holtey's comments are the political "stakes" surrounding the production and reification of New Left memory in specific historical moments. For this reason, it is important to locate how and why this memory paradigm of the "terrorists' were also '68ers" emerged and became "naturalized" within the West German, mainstream media of the 1970s, a process that Rudi Dutschke and other extra-parliamentary activists increasingly sought to challenge inside and outside of the newsroom. 12 Developing protest strategies that on the one hand effectively transcended the violent memories associated with the New Left and left-wing terrorism/urban guerrilla movements and on the other hand built upon the positive legacies of the New Left proved to be a primary concern for post-New Left activists.
First and foremost, throughout much of the 1970s, seemingly "organic" connections between the activism of the New Left and the "terrorism" of armed guerrilla movements proved effective for countering the calls of emerging social movements. For example, as news crews covered the violent conflicts between police and protesters near the construction sites of nuclear facilities in Wyhl and Brokdorf, crucial events that raised greater public awareness for citizens' initiatives as well as the anti-nuclear and Green movements, the incidents also evoked memories of the previous decade's confrontations between New Left activists and the police (Zint and Lutterbeck, 1977) . As a result, liberal and conservative commentators often depicted engagements between anti-nuclear squatters and police agencies as the continuation of a decade's long battle between the radical left and the state. 13 Regarding the growing feminist movements of the 1970s, strategies to delegitimize extra-parliamentary activism through memory were even more acute. For instance, following the arrest of the RAF co-founders Gudrun Ensslin and Ulrike Meinhof in the summer of 1972, liberal and conservative publications were quick to blame the seemingly large number of women in urban guerrilla movements as a byproduct of "too much emancipation," a process that began within the volatile politics of the 1960s. In this respect, "female guerillas functioned as lightning rods for the expression of broader social anxieties over rapidly changing gender relations and the (in) stability of the nuclear family," an idea echoed by Clare Bielby and others (Rosenfeld, 2010: 354) . 14 As I will outline shortly, "amazon terrorists" who were "deviant" mothers were not the only targets. In general, descriptions of urban guerrillas as terroristic, criminal, selfindulgent, erratic, deviant, and irrationally violent influenced the writing of student movement memory and thus to some extent delegitimized the political aspirations of the past throughout most of the 1970s. Moments of remembrance in the mass media would only strengthen these real and imagined discursive ties.
Burgeoning extra-parliamentary social movements were not the only groups targeted, as conservative media personalities naturalized memories of the West German student movement as violent to dismiss the political challenges posed against them by the parliamentary left. For example, when speaking to corporate employees on 29 December 1972, the conservative owner of Axel Springer Verlag expressed pessimism about his firm's prospects in the upcoming year. To support this claim, Axel Springer embraced a memory narrative which stressed the success of Springer Verlag throughout the West German economic miracle of the 1950s. In Springer's estimation, corporate growth was undermined with "the rise of negative public opinion in 1966" and when "the ultra-left in 1967 branded us as a show-horse, as a symbolicfigure of the system." Citing the recent RAF-bombing of his publishing house in Hamburg and the SPD-led, parliamentary investigations into his corporation's influence on public opinion, Springer declared, "our house is powerful and this in spite of the nearly permanent bombardment not only from the radical but also the progressive left."
Springer's use of the word "bombardment" was not by accident. Nor was the linking of New Left activism, urban guerrilla attacks against his property, and parliamentary media commissions, as the conflation of diverse contexts and forms of activism emphasized an important theme in his talk, "I can only repeat, an agitating minority has unbelievably succeeded, and it still demands the asset-liquidation of our house" (Springer, 1972) . For Springer, evoking the violence of the New Left past and the urban guerrilla present effectively dismissed the extra-parliamentary and parliamentary challenges of the West German left and presented his firm as both a symbol of democratic resilience and a victim of left-wing aggression. Conflating of corporation and nation, Springer Verlag and the West German Republic continued to be siege by the left.
Given these narratives, it is unsurprising how -largely irrespective of a mainstream media outlet's politics-left-wing terror emerged as an unavoidable issue when commemorating the 10-year anniversary of Ohnesorg's death. For instance, while commentator Michael Jürgs offered a liberal reading of the student movement as reformist in the moderate weekly-illustrated Stern, the conclusion was only reached after a thorough discussion of the RAF's violent actions. More extreme were the remarks of the conservative commentator Hans Habe who described "terrorism as the bastard child of the APO movement" and complained bitterly about the champions of "APO nostalgia" in Springer Verlag's weekend tabloid Bild am Sonntag. 15 Less sensationalistic -albeit similar in tone-was an article entitled "The Shot that Triggered the Terror," found in the 2 June 1977 edition of Stern. The author of the article, the 30-year-old contributing editor and former student activist Claus Lutterbeck, quickly located the origins of contemporary terrorism within the New Left of the 1960s, declaring, "At the beginning stood police violence, at the end stood horrible assassinations, bank robberies, and a kidnapping by the 2 June Movement." 16 The text-based narrative was visually supported on the following page by an image of the incarcerated RAF co-founder Horst Mahler, described in a small caption as "the ex-Student, ex-Juso, ex-lawyer, ex-guerrilla, and ex-KPD man who is now again in search of a political home." Mahler's apparent lack of political stability was confirmed by a second bold font text proclaiming, "What we did at that time was senseless." Images reinforced text, describing the forms of violence deployed by state, student activist, and contemporary terrorist as irrational and ultimately regrettable. Vague descriptions of Mahler, Meinhof, and the former 2 June Movement activist Bommi Baumann's transformations into terror -which only seemingly stemmed from either the Ohnesorg shooting or Dutschke's near death in 1968-reinforced the point and stripped any possible political meaning from their expressions of revolutionary violence. Lutterbeck depicted Mahler and others as men incapable of maintaining an ideological position, while other terrorists engaged in common criminal acts devoid of political meaning such as kidnapping and bank robbery. In general, a lack of political conviction characterized former student New Leftists as a whole, with Lutterbeck concluding, "a few, such as Mahler and Teufel, are in the slammer, yet many are today teachers or state lawyers, have occupational bans or a right to a pension, are dentists or engineers" (Lutterbeck, 1977a) . A clear message soon emerged from such stories. If former student activists did not turn to apolitical terror or criminality, they instead embraced the same institutions that they looked to challenge in the late 1960s, once again dismissing the very real political claims promoted by the New Left.
Dutschke as memory advocate and defender of the Student Movement Past
In media-created moments of commemoration and remembrance such as the 10-year anniversary of the shooting death of Benno Ohnesorg, former New Left leaders and activists were sought-after sources who, through personal anecdote, reflection, and testimony, humanized as well as reinforced media-produced, hegemonic memories of the past. Speaking to Kansteiner's claim "that memory is valorized where identity is problematized" (Kansteiner:15), former activists possessed some ability -at least in theory-to shape the memory narratives used in a mass media story. Here structural factors proved important. First, many mass media executives believed that politically diverse programming and copy would provide West German citizens with a variety of informed viewpoints and hence would help produce a more vibrant post-fascist democracy (Goehle, 2014: 227-228) . 17 This liberal-minded view towards media content provided a number of creative opportunities for former 1960s luminaries within West German public television in particular. A noteworthy example was Ulrike Meinhof. Contacted and contracted by the Arbeitsgemeinschaft der öffentlich-rechtlichen Rundfunkanstalten der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (The Consortium of Public Broadcasters in Germany, ARD), Meinhof produced an original, fictional screenplay on the conditions of women's reform homes entitled Bambule. Due to Meinhof's involvement in the liberation of her future co-founder Andreas Baader from incarceration, the television movie was cancelled 10 days before its intended premier on 24 May 1970 (Bauer, 2008 (Aust, 1974) . 18 As I have discussed elsewhere, progressive television content produced ratings and, for better or for worse, vocal responses (Goehle, 2014: 225-231) .
Such factors were not lost on print elites who, when also faced with the inner Pressefreiheit (Internal Press Freedom) 19 movement of the late 1960s and 1970s, granted greater degrees of autonomy and opportunity within media organizations for activists and journalists alike. Still, the ability to shape content remained more elusive in privately-owned, media outlets than in public television. For instance, throughout 1967 and 1968, the photographer Michael Ruetz enjoyed unparalleled access within the West Berlin counterculture and took now famous photographs of Rudi Dutschke and other protest era notables. Selling his prints to a host of daily and weekly print outlets, Ruetz parlayed his photographs into a job with the moderate-liberal weekly magazine Stern. Disillusionment quickly set-in; serving as a staff writer and photographer from 1969-1973, Ruetz complained bitterly of constant editorial meddling and of his content being removed from what he believed to be its intended context. In Ruetz's estimation, demands for greater freedom within the editorial room failed to gain traction. 20 Such accounts remain telling. While former activists and protest personalities gained footholds within the media "Establishment" throughout the 1970s and thus provided contemporary activists such as Dutschke institutional spaces for memory advocacy, their ability to control the intended meaning of their material remained often tenuous at best.
For these reasons, matters of editorial control raised broader questions about autonomy, subversion, and media tactics among the non-guerrilla, radical West German left of 1970s. Indeed, activists increasingly wrestled with the following quandary: Was the most effective strategy for inspiring revolutionary change to continue developing "counter publics" that increased distribution of alternative publications and yet ran the risk of "ghettoization?" Or was it to reach broader audiences by collaborating with mainstream publishers who looked to appropriate left-wing activism for a host of reasons? Of course, the coopting of the New Left, its advocates, and its ideas by mainstream publishers was not a new phenomenon in the 1970s. As the historian Timothy Scott Brown outlines in his important monograph West Germany and the Global Sixties: The Antiauthoritarian Revolt 1962 Revolt -1978 , beginning in the mid-1960s, West German book publishers looked to satisfy emerging, left-wing youth markets by offering the texts of Mao, Fanon, and Marcuse as well as up-to-date studies on fellow student movements across the globe. According to Brown, "this wide availability of texts was a double-edged sword, however, for many saw in the pronounced role of the mainstream press an act of capitalist recuperation that sold the left back its own ideas, robbing them of their subversive potential in the process" (Brown, 2013: 147) . In Brown's estimation, this logic encouraged "self-organization" and additional expansion of the underground press into the 1970s; it also propelled attacks on individuals including Dutschke who were willing to publish with and in some cases profit from mainstream presses (Ibid.).
Although Dutschke faced creative challenges within the mainstream media, the likes of which I will outline shortly, the level of editorial insight enjoyed by an "outsider" like Dutschke remained unique throughout the 1970s, as the former student movement icon enjoyed access within the mainstream press that was to great extent unmatched by his fellow activists. 21 Such capital was in part a byproduct of Dutschke's charismatic personality and political intelligence, which was evident in his public appearances, interviews, and essays. Important as well was the level of empathy exhibited by prominent media and public personalities following Easter 1968. For example, while disagreeing with his politics, the conservative CDU politician and owner of Die Zeit Gerd Buccerius nonetheless voluntarily paid Dutschke's legal fees and medical bills immediately following the student's near death during Easter 1968 (Dahrendorf, 2001: 6) . Likewise, the owner of Der Spiegel Rudolf Augstein provided Dutschke with financial support while he pursued his graduate studies at Cambridge in 1970. 22 So too did the protestant theologian and personal friend Helmut Gollwitzer who, as a standing member of the HeinrichHeine-Foundation for Philosophy and Critical Scholarship, secured Dutschke a monthly 2000 German-Mark stipend in 1971 (Chaussy, 1983: 297-298) . Through Gollwitzer, Dutschke also met Gustav Heinemann. As president of the Federal Republic, Heinemann like Gollwitzer financially aided Dutschke at Cambridge and, in 1971, helped pay for Dutschke's relocation to Denmark following his expulsion as a "potential threat to national security" from Great Britain (Chaussy, 1983: 309) . Receiving a Danish residency permit to study and to work at the University of Aarhus, Dutschke continued to receive financial honorariums for essays, commentaries, and opinion pieces throughout the 1970s. Indeed, in letter exchanges with Augstein or during visits with Heinemann and Gollwitzer at the latter's West Berlin home, Dutschke expressed polite appreciation for such funding. This is unsurprising; frequently experiencing epileptic seizures as a result of the injuries sustained from his near-death prior to Easter 1968, Dutschke's physical health impeded his ability to financially support his family, a concern frequently raised in his correspondences and diary entries. 23 Despite such support, Dutschke continued to look unfavorably upon much of the mainstream media, a product of his belief in Frankfurt School critical theory, his commitment to "marching through the institutions," and his own harassment at the hands of Springer Verlag. Moreover, such hostility shaped his steadfast commitment towards advancing a particular vision of West Germany's "1968," as Dutschke aggressively pursued action against the press and those outlets that he deemed either misrepresented his previous decade's activities or negatively affected the present-day social movements that he supported. These actions additionally provided opportunities for Dutschke to crystallize and reinforce his positions about the past among contemporary activists. For example, infuriated by a 2 February 1976 Die Welt article titled "Dutschke's Dream of German Socialism," the activist filed a libel lawsuit against his former antagonist, the publishing giant Axel Springer Verlag. 24 With the help of the lawyer Otto Schily, formal legal papers were drafted on 18 March 1976 that challenged the article's depiction of Dutschke and his student movement era activism. In particular, the lawsuit targeted Die Welt's portrayal of Dutschke and his involvement with the events of 1967 and 1968. It also refuted claims that Dutschke stood "at the head of demonstrations against Springer Verlag, the Shah, and the shooting of the student Benno Ohnesorg in 1967." Asserting that the language used by Die Welt was both misleading and vague, the legal papers claimed Dutschke did not in fact demonstrate outside of Springer's West Berlin headquarters in 1967. The lawsuit also argued how the article was guilty of implying Dutschke participated in the Easter clashes of 1968. In reality, Dutschke was fighting for his life and was receiving treatment for the wounds inflicted by Bachmann. Equally problematic was the newspaper's claim that the activist currently sought a political party located somewhere "between the SPD and the KPD." Dutschke was adamant that he never "sought to call for a party in his life" and was merely looking to establish a new left-wing social coalition, a point that will be developed in a few moments. 25 After numerous delays, the court dismissed Dutschke's lawsuit, citing three photographs that showed Dutschke participating in a sit-in outside of the Springer headquarters in 1967. 26 There is much to extract from this legal exchange. First, the lawsuit's focus on accuracy and language reflects Dutschke's general unease concerning the composition of media-produced memory and the public's synthesis of it. Moreover, Dutschke's fears about the manipulation of the past and the ways in which such misrepresentation could influence the public opinion of the present were not exclusive towards the mainstream press. Similar concerns weighed heavily on Dutschke's mind when dealing with his own political allies and colleagues. His letter exchanges with Schily throughout the libel lawsuit against Die Welt indicate as much. A civil liberties advocate who first gained public prominence for his legal defense of student activists in the late 1960s, Schily continued to represent the left in a number of cases throughout the 1970s. In addition to providing legal counsel for any number of incarcerated RAF members, most notably the organization's cofounder Gudrun Ensslin, Schily worked tirelessly to establish the eventual Green parliamentary party. 27 Given these circles and credentials, Schily predictably knew Dutschke since the mid-1960s and had even stood alongside the student activist at the funeral of the RAF member and hunger strike victim Holger Meins in November 1974.
Despite their friendship, Schily's diverse interests seemingly escalated tensions throughout Dutschke's libel case against Springer Verlag. Angered by the court's decision, Dutschke questioned Schily's commitment to the lawsuit as well as the lawyer's inability to obtain a public retraction from the Springer-owned newspaper. 28 By the end of March, nearly two weeks after the drafting of the petition, Dutschke wrote the lawyer and asked why he had failed to file the court documents in a timely manner. Initially, Dutschke expressed religiousbased concerns, as the pious activist grew nervous that Schily's lack of action could delay the trial to the "first day of the Easter Holiday," a day that in his opinion should be devoid of "class conflict." 29 Religiousbased distress was noticeably absent in a second letter to Schily however, as Dutschke now feared that a trial would fall on the eightyear anniversary of his attack at the hands of Bachmann. Once again, anxieties about the politics of the past produced strife, as Dutschke accused Schily of purposely delaying the proceedings for political ends, placing the verb einkalkulieren (taking into account) in quotation marks and quickly reminding the lawyer, "1968 is not 1976." 30 Although never explicitly stated, Dutschke's suspicion of Schily and his apparent "memory motives" was most likely a product of two interconnected issues: the lawyer's legal defense of the RAF and Dutschke's own complicated and changing views about the urban guerrilla organization over the course of the 1970s. On the one hand, as exemplified by Dutschke's editorial for Die Zeit at the introduction of this paper, Dutschke increasingly exhibited little tolerance for the tactics pursued by the RAF. Summarizing her husband's views on the matter of violence and left-wing terrorism, Gretchen Dutschke recalled that, "in principal, Rudi did not oppose the violence of class conflict. This he saw as the defense against suppressive violence. But he made a distinction between illegal struggle, class conflict violence, and terrorism…Rudi had no sympathy for terroristic action" and "found their ideas to be false" (Dutschke, 2003: 397-398) . On the other hand, despite his belief that left-wing terrorism was despotic and "politically without relevancy and perspective" (Dutschke, 2003: 231) , Dutschke "understood how the people of the RAF thought" (Dutschke, 2003: 397-398) . For example, as earlier noted, Dutschke appeared with Schily at the funeral of Holger Meins in November 1974. By famously raising his fist and declaring, "Holger, the struggle continues," Dutschke looked to balance his criticisms of the RAF's terrorist tactics and his solidarity with the group's alleged goals of achieving socialism in the Federal Republic. Nonetheless, imprisoned members of the RAF greeted his gestures with scorn and the mainstream press quickly labeled Dutschke an "RAF apologist" (Dutschke, 1996: 348) . And even while in his diary he privately expressed hope that Schily could use the Stammheim criminal trials for Ulrike Meinhof, Andreas Baader, Gudrun Ensslin, and Jan-Carl Raspe politically for "public purposes" (Dutschke, 1996: 245), Dutschke's letters to the lawyer reveal a person concerned with how certain segments of the extra-parliamentary left appropriated both his person and the student movement past.
To this degree, the Die Welt affair exemplifies not only Dutschke's attempts to combat negative memories of the New Left past found in the press but also his willingness to confront those allies who he believed could misuse the New Left past and possibly damage any attempts to establish socialism in West Germany. Such memory advocacy is unsurprising, given how Dutschke believed "his role was to remind his new comrades about social issues and to warn them not to make the same mistakes that had been made in the 1960s" (Cornils, 1998: 112) . Thus, when his health permitted it, Dutschke served as more than a simple symbol or role model for the newest manifestations of socialist-based protest such as the pre-parliamentary party Greens; he also frequently participated in university-based teach-ins and advocated for any number of student-based organizations. For many contemporary activists, Dutschke was a left-wing "kingmaker," a respected and sought-after figure who could legitimize one's position in public. Thus, in order to gain Dutschke's "blessing" and more importantly his contacts within the media, activists in the latter half of the 1970s commonly evoked their own involvement with the student movement past. For example, when writing to Dutschke in June 1977, the Turkish-born, West German-educated Hakkı Keskin began his letter by first mentioning his involvement in a number of TurkishGerman student groups in late 60s West Berlin. An outspoken advocate for the Turkish-German community who became the first person of Turkish descent elected to the German parliament in 1993, Keskin gained minor notoriety in 1969 when, following "a speech in front of the Turkish embassy condemning censorship and inequalities of wealth in Turkey," his German student visa was revoked (Slobodian, 2012: 33) . 31 Only after outlining his own student movement credentials and declaring his solidarity with Dutschke could Keskin criticize the former student leader's confrontational tone in a recent teach-in with Uwe Wesel, a law professor at FU Berlin who was a leading advocate for the founding of an alternative political party. 32 Held in the Audimax of the FU Berlin and featuring Dutschke, Schily, and the political scientist Ekkehard Krippendorf, the 2 June 1977 teach-in was not without its own memory politics, as it discussed the state of the extra-parliamentary left approximately ten years to the day of Ohnesorg's shooting (Reinecke, 2003: 200-203) . The reasons driving Keskin's criticisms were clear; Dutschke's presence was necessary to overcome the sectarianism of the West German radical left and to unite any emerging West German alternative movement in the second half of the 1970s.
These realities were not lost on Dutschke, who was well-aware of his influence among any number of West German social milieus and structures. In response to Keskin, Dutschke acknowledged his own media capital, at one point sympathizing with Keskin's troubles in securing a publisher for a manuscript regarding the life of Turkish students in West Germany and agreeing to share the text with his "publishing contacts." 33 To this degree, Dutschke proved amiable for advancing Turkish-German political rights. Second, Dutschke realized his continued ability to define the radical left in West Germany, expressing some regret for his outburst against Wesel, but refusing to apologize for the aggressive stance that he took against the more ambitious participants of the sit-in. Here again, Dutschke expressed his suspicions about Schily, who in his view had previously "exhibited uncritical sympathies with the 2 June Movement." Dutschke also raised his continued concerns about the founding of an alternative political party that would become "institutionalized" and lack mass support. Once more, Dutschke's reservations with the direction and presentation of contemporary social movements were heavily informed by his concerns with public opinion and specifically the media's role in shaping it. Consequently, as evidenced by his interactions with Schily and Keskin, Dutschke exhibited caution when creating public alliances and sharing his media contacts with activists.
Dutschke, "Ten Years After," and the German Autumn
Throughout the summer of 1977, Dutschke's skepticism also characterized his interactions with the mass media and specifically his participation in a four-edition story for Stern entitled "Ten Years After." Media remembrances of the Ohnesorg shooting continued to generate a great deal of public interest. Consequently, the editors of Stern once again asked Lutterbeck to write a commemorative essay on the West German New Left. Beginning his research in June, Lutterbeck spent the summer interviewing prominent former student actors. Still, Dutschke remained the star of the series, as evidenced by Lutterbeck's claims in the introduction of his exposé that he had spent nearly fourteen total hours speaking with the activist (Lutterbeck, 1977b) . Sometime in August of 1977, Lutterbeck sent Dutschke a preliminary draft for review. By the first week of September, Lutterbeck received a letter that he would later describe as a "denouncement." 34 Repeatedly questioning Lutterbeck's credentials as a journalist, Dutschke admonished the writer for making "too many minor detail mistakes" and cited instances in which greater perspective would have represented the New Left era in a far more positive light. Dutschke also chastised Lutterbeck for implying that he financially profited from his activism with the media between December 1967 and February 1968. The issue of violence was also raised, with Dutschke proclaiming, "If Stern writes about Dutschke and Bachmann, why is it that they do not write about our letter exchange?" 35 Rather than discuss the more civil correspondences of Dutschke and Bachmann before his suicide in 1970, Dutschke believed that Lutterbeck over-emphasized the violence surrounding 1960s, student movement activism.
Similar to the Die Welt lawsuit, Dutschke attacked specific details of a story to dismiss the characterization of the student movement as violent or self-indulgent. Yet unlike the Die Welt affair, the letter did not simply reject Lutterbeck's article for its lack of detail; it also offered alternative memory narratives that advanced the causes of contemporary left-wing activism. For Dutschke, Lutterbeck portrayed the end of leftist politics with the disbanding of the APO and the rise of the Red Army Faction in 1970, showing "no interest in the advancement of socialism." Infuriated, Dutschke outlined any number of larger social movements whose origins were linked with the politics of the student movement, including the emerging feminist and Green movements. Absent from the list of course were those groups who embraced revolutionary forms of violence after 1968, including the RAF and the 2 June Movement. And this was precisely the point. Even before famously denouncing the RAF in the pages of Die Zeit, Dutschke's memory work with the media looked to deemphasize the violent and self-indulgent features of the late 1960s and rather promote what he viewed to be the legitimate political work underpinning the student movement. Such a strategy separated the RAF with the deeds of the student movement, legitimizing the politics of the New Left past and the left-wing, socialist-inspired activism of the present. 36 Shocked by the letter, Lutterbeck nonetheless restated his "solidarity" with Dutschke and accommodated many of the activist's complaints. Lutterbeck admitted that he was unaware of the correspondences between Dutschke and Bachmann and, in an underlined typed font, asked Dutschke to send the letters quickly. At the same time, Lutterbeck admonished Dutschke for his comments regarding post-student movement activism, insisting that he did indeed mention radical movements such as the Spontis. 37 Still, Lutterbeck was conciliatory in tone and insisted that he was "reading and reading" revisions. He also actively played to Dutschke's media prejudices, acknowledging the "many grounds for your hate of the press" and dismissing Stern's editorial staff for "always making more problems." Lutterbeck's willingness to consider Dutschke's memory agenda is perhaps best evidenced in the final product, published in the 20 to 26 October edition of Stern. Per the activist's suggestions, Lutterbeck reduced his coverage of the Dutschke shooting and devoted a full week's text to contemporary socialist-based organizations with links to the APO past. Lutterbeck's narrative also emphasized the separation of the New Left past with the terror of the German Autumn. The journalist explored the rise of Baader-Meinhof in the third week of the exclusive, but his narrative's timeline rarely progressed past the foundation of the RAF in 1970. This is a surprising development, given that Lutterbeck's article appeared after the conclusion of the German Autumn, yet before episodic stories about the event could appear in print. And even here, when Lutterbeck did discuss the frenzied environment of the German Autumn, Lutterbeck went as far as to quote Dutschke's denouncement of the RAF in the Die Zeit (Lutterbeck, 1977b) . The article did not promote a socialist agenda per say, but it did offer a more balanced analysis of the New Left that distanced its history from the terror of the RAF.
Conclusion
Lutterbeck's four-week story on the New Left speculatively indicates the lengths in which left-wing activists such as Dutschke could counter and influence media-produced memory narratives in moments of commemoration and crisis. These matters of media, memory, and contestation are also useful topics for raising larger conclusions about 1) the degrees in which the mainstream mass media exists as a field of hegemonic struggle in general and 2) the reconfiguration of the West German, extra-parliamentarian left through the use of the mainstream mass media in particular. About the former, an underlining premise of this essay has been that Rudi Dutschke -like Gramsci earlier-conceived of the mainstream mass media as a crucial institution for regulating public opinion and for reifying status-quo attitudes, ideologies, and memories about radical activism and the recent New Left past. Still, as the communication scholar David Holmes reminds us about Gramsci and his ideas on hegemony, "the fact that one class may monopolize the means of mental and material production does not guarantee that it can simply impose its ideas; rather, these ideas are negotiated in a way in which their rule is accepted" (Holmes, 2005: 28) . Indeed, my case study on Dutschke has displayed the mainstream media's dependence upon testimony and the cooperation of former New Leftists to legitimize institutionallyapproved memories and to delegitimize radical activism in both its historical and contemporary expressions. By offering opportunities for reflection and remembrance, the mass media unintentionally afforded the necessary spaces for activists to "march through the institutions" and to introduce at the very least counter-hegemonic narratives that can help further the causes of social movements. More broadly speaking then, media-produced memory provides vehicles for both upholding hegemony and undermining institutional power. It reflects as well exposes the contradictions of hegemony.
Regarding the reconfiguration of the West German radical left and the use of the mainstream media to alter public opinion, Dutschke recognized the contradictions of hegemony and the ways in which memory "functioned" within the West German media institutions of the 1970s. Having secured honorariums, publishing contracts, and opportunities to comment upon contemporary politics, Dutschke acquired the institutional agency required to "negotiate" hegemony and to promote counter-hegemonic memory narratives even in moments when collective memories of the New Left as "violent" were seeming consensus, including the ten-year anniversary of Ohnesorg's shooting death or the German Autumn. As I have argued throughout the paper, Dutschke's "capital" within the mainstream media was a key ingredient that allowed the activist to emerge as a veritable "gatekeeper" of New Left memory, a status that on occasion brought him into conflict with journalists or fellow activists who did not share his memory narratives or his insistence upon emphasizing specific details. Nor was his willingness to collaborate with media institutions in order to shape public opinion about extra-parliamentary activism above criticism, especially for urban guerrillas as well as more radical members of the West German left who believed autonomy from and violence against established institutions were necessary tactics for revolutionary change. Indeed, Dutschke's progressive memories of the New Left -sanitized memories that downplayed the "violent" backstories linking the New Left, the RAF, and himself-reflected broader attempts on the part of the contemporary radical left to distance itself from the "terroristic" strikes of left-wing urban guerrilla outfits and to legitimize new expressions of social activism. Taking into account the hysteria surrounding the actions of urban guerrilla activists, Dutschke seemingly viewed his strategy of memory advocacy as a tool "not of retrieval but of reconfiguration that colonizes the past by obliging it to conform to present configurations" (quoted in Zelizer, 1998: 3) . As a result, Dutschke's insistence on discipline and "accuracy" in representing the New Left past reflects what communication and social movement scholar Ralph Negrine has described as the "professionalization of dissent," or the contemporary "need to adopt a professional approach to their communication strategies so as to better organize themselves, persuade and mobilize supporters, and challenge opposition" (Negrine, 2012: 29) . While Fahlenbrach and others have noted degrees of professionalism in how New Leftists studied existing forms of media and from it developed tactics to promote dissident and group identities (Goehle, 2014: 221-223) , 38 Dutschke's memory advocacy reflects the maturation of left-wing activism. To this end, Dutschke looked to apply positive memories of the New Left consistently in any number of forums and relationships -whether at public rallies, within the media, or when attempting to influence the tactics of his fellow activists-in order to create a positive, symbiotic relationship between past and present forms of extra-parliamentarian activism. In the aforementioned words of Barbie Zelizer, memory was "social, cultural, and/or political action" for Dutschke (Zelizer, 1998: 3) . Hockenos, Paul (2008) . Joschka Fischer and 2 Throughout the paper, I use "New Left" as a shorthand, "umbrella" term for the various factions (APO, SDS, and Kommune I) and labels (antiauthoritarian, counterculture, and 68er) associated with the activism of 1960s West Germany.
3 "Mass Media" and "Mainstream Media" will be used interchangeably throughout the paper to describe the public broadcasting systems and corporate journalism of the era.
4 In Counterrevolution and Revolt, Marcuse describes Dutschke's "long march," stating that "to extend the base of the student movement, Rudi Dutschke has proposed the strategy of the long march through the institutions (Marcuse's italicization): working against the established institutions while working in them, but not simply by "boring from within," rather by "doing the job," learning (how to program and read computers, how to teach at all levels of education, how to use the mass media, how to organize production, how to recognize and eschew planned obsolescence, how to design, et cetera), and at the same time preserving one's own consciousness in working with the others (Marcuse, 1972: 55) .
5 For more about the uses and abuses of the Nazi past by students and officials alike, consult (Davis, 2006 (Kraushaar, 1998 (Kraushaar, , 2000 . For national accounts, consult (Thomas, 2003; Klimke and Scharloth, 2007) . For "internationalist" perspectives, see (Fink et al., 1998; Suri, 2003; Klimke and Scharloth, 2008) . For transnational studies, see (Klimke, 2010; Klimke et al., 2010; Slobodian, 2012; Brown 2013) . rather, managers, who identify politically and ideologically with the ruling class, provide 'the organic intellectuals' who are at the front line of hegemonic struggle" (Holmes, 2005: 28) . For Gramsci, the mass media was a critical institution of control within capitalist economies. As I will reveal throughout this paper, Dutschke's status as a "student movement icon" allowed him to evolve as a memory "manager" and "organic intellectual" of the New Left in the 1970s, a status that he sought to exploit with his counter-hegemonic narratives of the past. In this respect, agreeing to publish with commercial publishers and to grant interviews with mainstream media outlets allowed Dutschke to reach broader audiences and, in effect, to impact public opinion.
Regarding the influence of György Lukács, Frantz Fanon, and Antonio Gramsci on Dutschke, see (Slobodian, 2012: 50-61 (Dutschke, 1974) .
9 For more about the influence of the "avant-garde" and especially of the Situationist movement on the West German New Left, consult (Lee, 2007; Klimke, 2009) . For discussions about the influence of the "avant garde" on the students' communicative strategies, see (Fahlenbrach, 2002) . The literature exploring the connections between "avant-garde" movements and West German left-wing terrorism is similarly vast. For critical surveys of these arguments, as well as what Hanno Balz describes as the "mediality" of urban guerrilla-style assaults, see (Balz, 2008 (Balz, , 2014 .
10 In particular, see Meinhof's essays from 1968, "Counter-Violence" and "From Protest to Resistance." Quality translations of her essays can be found in (Bauer, 2008: 234-238, 239-243 (Dutschke, 1996) .
While Dutschke failed to use the dynamite, critics such as Kraushaar and Götz Aly cite such incidents as evidence of the violent nature of the "68ers" (Aly, 2009) . Also see (Herf, 2008) .
In an English-translation essay, the historian Ingrid Gilcher-Holtey has offered perhaps the most comprehensive rebuttal, criticizing Kraushaar's work for its lack of historical and theoretical precision. In Gilcher-Holtey's estimation, "neither taking respectively (Klimke, 2010; Slobodian, 2012) . See as well (Varon, 2004; Rabehl, 2007) .
12 Regarding the West German media's coverage and response to student activism in the late 1960s, once again, the topic is immense. See (Goehle, 2010 (Goehle, , 2014 . Regarding the media's coverage of the RAF, see (Weinhauer et al., 2006) .
13 For more on the paradigm of the "Red Decade," see (Koenen, 2001 ).
14 Specifically, Bielby has argued that it was within "the print media of the 1970s where the woman terrorist became a print media phenomenon and was set up as "other' to the German mother and, arguably too, the German nation" (Bielby, 2012: 11) 16 As will be discussed in a few minutes, Lutterbeck relied on many student movement contacts and frequently incorporated the quotes of former activists. He also collaborated with anti-nuclear activists and published with left-wing printing houses, as evidenced by his co-authorship of the anti-nuclear volume Atomkraft:
Fotodokumente vom "Bürgerdialog" um Atomenergie (Zint and Lutterbeck, 1977) .
17 For more on the liberal mission of West German television programmers, see (Vogel, 2010) . Christina von Hodenberg addresses the liberal tendencies of public television executives and a number of print media administrators throughout the "long 1960s"
(von Hodenberg, 2006).
